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Abstract 
This research concurrently investigated the effectiveness of three established bias-
reducing interventions (i.e., positive affirmation, secure attachment, and cognitive dissonance) 
in the wake of the Paris and Brussels terror attacks. Using frequentist and Bayesian analyses, 
Study 1 (N = 1676), launched within days of the attacks, found that compared to a control 
condition, the interventions did not significantly improve intergroup attitudes. Instead, the 
data showed strong support of the null hypotheses that there were no intervention effects. 
Proximity to the attacks did not moderate the effect. Study 2 (N = 285) re-examined the 
effects of the three interventions 2.5 years after the attacks, generally replicating the pattern of 
findings in Study 1. Together, this research highlights the challenge of intergroup bias-
reduction following terror attacks. We conclude by discussing several recommendations for 
how psychological interventions could play a more impactful role in contexts of heightened 
conflict. 
Key words: terrorism; intergroup attitudes, self-affirmation; secure attachment; 
dissonance induction 
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Can Psychological Interventions Improve Intergroup Attitudes Post Terror Attacks?  
Aside from destroying lives, terror attacks disrupt community cohesion and intergroup 
relations (Kaiser, Vick, & Major, 2004; Van De Vyver, Houston, Abrams, & Vasiljevic, 
2016), by sowing the seeds of hostility and suspicion (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). Terror 
attacks can also increase unfavorable attitudes towards groups that share common social 
attributes with the terrorists (e.g., being Muslim; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 
1998). To illustrate, following the Madrid attacks in 2004, average levels of stereotypes 
towards related (Arabs) and even unrelated (Jews) outgroups increased (Echebarria-Echabe & 
Fernàndez-Guede, 2006), akin to the U.S. public opinion data showing elevated national 
levels of racism and Islamophobia among Americans after the 9/11 attacks (Panagopoulos, 
2006). Moreover, terror attacks can also instill individuals with the motivation for vicarious 
retribution (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006), prompting violent 
counter-attacks against the “guilty by association” (e.g., a White man driving a van into a 
group of Muslims near a north London mosque; The Guardian, 2017; Doosje et al., 1998; 
Pratt, 2015). Such attempts to take justice into one’s own hand may ironically advance the 
very objective of terrorism to corrode individuals’ confidence in their government’s ability to 
protect its citizens. In fact, blame may be attributed to one’s own government for provoking 
such attacks (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009), resulting in further social and political divide in 
the societies.  
To mitigate these damaging consequences of terrorism, psychological interventions 
could be helpful. Past studies have shown that several interventions are effective in reducing 
intergroup biases, such as self-affirmation (Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & 
Ross, 2011), secure attachment (Saleem et al., 2015), and cognitive dissonance (Exline, 
Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, & Witvliet, 2008). However, they are often examined in isolation. 
Little is known about their comparative effectiveness. Even less is known about whether these 
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bias reduction interventions would be effective in a post-terror attack environment when 
social stigmas and biases run high. The present research addresses these issues. Specifically, 
we concurrently examined the effectiveness of three established interventions in the wake of 
the 2015 and 2016 ISIS terror attacks in Paris and Brussels. The effects of these interventions 
were examined on a wide range of intergroup outcomes among participants who were in close 
(the French and Belgians) or distant (the British and Americans) proximity to these terrorist 
attacks, being affected either directly or vicariously, respectively. 
The Current Research 
This research focused on three established bias-reduction interventions–self-
affirmation, secure attachment, and cognitive dissonance–for a number of reasons. First, all 
three interventions are premised on a similar basic principle in that their effectiveness relies 
on focusing on aspects of the self (e.g., being reminded of a positive self, the self being 
attached to a significant figure, or being reminded of a wrongful collective that the self was 
part of) to shift intergroup attitudes. Second, these interventions are typically implemented by 
engaging participants with the manipulation through writing prompts, thereby reducing 
potential methodological confounds. Third, these interventions have all established their 
effectiveness in bias reduction (e.g., Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006; Exline et al., 2008; 
McGregor, Haji, & Kang, 2008; Saleem et al., 2015; Stone, Whitehead, Schmader, & Focella, 
2011). Fourth, comparing the relative effectiveness of these interventions has important novel 
contributions. Specifically, these interventions are the products of co-evolved theories that 
have been developed independent of each other. Their effectiveness has been tested 
separately, leading to disparate strands of literature. The current research offers a crucial 
departure from past research by examining the comparative effectiveness of these 
interventions concurrently. Fifth, traditionally, research associated with the three 
interventions is often conducted in laboratory contexts employing minimal group paradigm 
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with little history of intergroup tension, hostility, and terror (but see Čehajić-Clancy et al., 
2011 for an exception). Therefore, the present research further advances the literature by 
testing the intervention effectiveness squarely in a real-life setting at a time of heightened 
societal tension.  
It is important to note that the conditions under which the three interventions were 
examined here (i.e., in the aftermath of major terror attacks) were substantively different from 
those in past research (i.e., laboratory-based and minimum group paradigm-based studies 
involving artificially created groups with no history of enmity; Hebl & Dovidio, 2005). 
Consequently, the present research is not a direct replication of past research (Shrout & 
Rodgers, 2018). Rather, while maintaining identical manipulations as in past research, our 
work should be conceived as a conceptual replication with the aim to assess the relative 
intervention effectiveness and its generalizability across real-life settings (Fabrigar & 
Wegener, 2016). Reducing the current work to simply a replication or reproducibility study 
would be to lose sight of the novel contributions (see the five contributions mentioned above) 
this research offers. Crucially, by examining the relative effectiveness of the interventions, 
this study is primarily addressing the practical question of what can be done to improve 
intergroup attitudes following terror attacks. As such, this study also responds to recent calls 
to assess the societal relevance of laboratory-based interventions by examining them in more 
ecologically valid contexts (Giner-Sorolla, 2019; Paluck & Green, 2009). Below, we outline 
the gist of the theoretical underpinnings behind each selected intervention. 
Self-affirmation. According to Self-Affirmation Theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), 
individuals can tolerate threats to a specific aspect of their identity, so long as they can shift 
their attention to another aspect of their identity that is valued but not related to the one being 
threatened. For instance, induction of self-affirmation (but not group-affirmation) has been 
reported to increase willingness to accept responsibility for ingroup harm, feelings of 
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collective guilt, and endorsement of reparation policies (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011). Self-
affirmation is also known to reduce various types of prejudice, including religious 
stereotyping (Fein & Spencer, 1997) and sexual prejudice (Lehmiller, Law, & Tormala, 
2010).  
Secure attachment. Attachment theory highlights the psychological importance of the 
connection one has with (significant) others. Crucially, it theorizes that in response to threat 
and fear, individuals tend to seek proximity to attachment figures, whose supportiveness can 
lessen fear reactions (Bowlby, 1969, Saleem et al., 2015). In intergroup contexts, priming 
secure attachment reduces negative intergroup emotions and stereotypes as well as increases 
people’s prosocial attitudes and behaviors (Gillath, Sesko, Shaver, & Chun, 2010; Mikulincer 
& Shaver, 2001; Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, Nitzberg, 2005). Of importance to the present 
research, secure attachment can reduce negativity in intergroup interactions (Saleem et al., 
2015).  
Cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is induced through reminders of one’s 
inconsistent beliefs and actions (Festinger, 1962). Holding two incompatible attitudes is 
known to induce dissonance. To resolve such dissonance, attitudes are often changed, and this 
can be pursued as an effective strategy (Festinger, 1962). This intervention can involve the 
notion of the “myth of pure evil”, which refers to the belief that those who commit serious 
transgressions are bad people that are fundamentally different from good people such as 
oneself and one’s ingroup members (Baumeister, 1997). Studies have shown that inviting 
victims to reflect on their own groups’ capability to inflict similar harm onto others can 
increase victims’ empathy and even forgiveness towards their perpetrator groups (e.g., Exline 
et al., 2008). That is, in the present research, reminding individuals of their own potential 
fallibility might also reduce intergroup hostility following terror attacks.  
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Drawing on this intervention literature, we predicted that compared to the control 
condition, the three interventions would improve outgroup attitudes. Indeed, each of them 
might work for different reasons, given they operate along different psychological 
mechanisms. In particular, self-affirmation could restore participants’ threatened self-esteem 
after a terror attack aimed at their entire ingroup. In a similar vein, after terror attacks, people 
often seek support from one another, and therefore secure attachment could make this support 
from significant others mentally available. Finally, dissonance may help victimized 
individuals to cognitively rationalize the terror events by framing and “explaining” them as 
retaliatory attacks provoked by their own government’s foreign policies (e.g., invasions into 
Afghanistan and Iraq). Hence, we expected all three interventions to work, but we did not 
have a priori predictions about which interventions would be more effective relative to the 
others. 
Study 1 
On November 13, 2015 and March 22, 2016, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
carried out several attacks in the hearts of the capitals of France and Belgium, respectively. 
These attacks killed 164 people and left more than 620 citizens injured. To examine the bias-
reduction intervention effectiveness, data collection commenced within days following the 
attacks and was completed approximately three months after the attacks. Because it is 
plausible that proximity to the attacks may moderate the impact of the terrorist attacks and 
thereby may interact with the intervention strategies, our sample included both participants 
who were directly affected by the attacks (Belgians and French) as well as those who were 
geographically remote from the attacks, but whose countries’ governments have pursued 
foreign policies that could be seen as provoking such terror attacks (British and Americans). 
Method 
Participants 
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Our original sample comprised 1844 adults. Data were collected via university fora, 
Crowd-flower, M-Turk, and social media snowballing within days following the Paris and 
Brussels attacks (M = 9.05 days after the attack; SD = 7.97; 90% of participants responded 
within two weeks). All measures were administered in the official main language of the 
country where data were being collected (i.e., English in the U.S. and U.K., French in France 
and the Belgian sample). To obtain reliable translations, two co-authors, who are academic 
psychologists fluent in English and French, independently translated the original version and 
back-translated the other’s translation. Afterwards, all authors compared both versions to 
inspect their equivalence in order to arrive at consensual agreement on the final wording (for a 
similar procedure, see e.g., Chen, Van Assche, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & Beyers, 2015). 
Only those participants who had provided meaningful responses (i.e., in relation to the 
intended manipulation prompts) were included. As such, 71 (29 American, 11 British, 24 
French, and 7 Belgian) respondents were omitted because their priming responses indicated 
that they had not followed the specific manipulation instruction. That is, some respondents 
left the answering box open (N = 23), merely copy-pasted the instruction (N = 1), gave a very 
short, uninformative response (e.g., “good experience”, “friends”, “cool”, “felt proud”, or 
“loss of confidence”), or stated that they had “no idea” (N = 16), “don’t remember any 
experience” (N = 14), “don’t understand the question” (N = 4), or that they did not want to 
share personal details (N = 1). Finally, eleven participants were excluded because they gave 
nonsensical responses, such as “feef”, “X”, or “good light”. Further, 44 respondents were 
omitted from the analyses because they failed to correctly respond to the attention check 
question (see supplemental online materials, SOM, for more information). Finally, 26 (1 
American, 3 British, 12 French, and 10 Belgian) and 27 (15 British, 7 French, and 5 Belgian) 
were excluded because they had an Arab (or mixed Arab) background and their religious 
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affiliation was Islam, respectively. These participants were excluded because it was unclear 
whether their responses represented intergroup or intragroup attitudes.  
The final sample for the present analysis came from 1676 White Caucasian online 
respondents (37% male; M age = 30 years; SD = 12.37; 381 French, 169 Belgians, 688 
British, and 438 Americans). Politically, the sample was normally distributed in terms of left 
to right spectrum (31% left, 44% center, 25% right). This sample also ensured, at least, 350 
participants per condition, which is double the number of participants per condition used in 
past research. A power analysis (using G*Power) revealed that our statistical power to 
adequately detect both a small and a medium main effect in this sample was well above the 
recommended standard of .80 (power ≥ .99). Nonetheless, the sample may be underpowered 
to detect interaction effects between intervention and country. 
Procedure 
In both studies, we report all measures, manipulations and exclusions. Our study 
included an Intervention (self-affirmation, secure attachment, dissonance, & control) X 
Country (France, Belgium, USA & UK) between-participants design.  
Interventions. The instructions for the manipulations were taken verbatim from 
published work:  
● self-affirmation, identical to Čehajić-Clancy et al. (2011, Study 2, p. 261): “Think 
about your greatest personal strength of which you are really proud. Recall a time 
when you used this personal strength to achieve a personal goal. Please briefly 
describe what this experience was like.”, 
● secure attachment, identical to Saleem et al. (2015, Study 3, Online Appendix, p. 26): 
“Recall a time when someone close to you was available, supportive, and loving. This 
could be a family member, relationship partner, or close friend. Please briefly describe 
what this experience was like below.”, 
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● cognitive dissonance (reminder of ingroup potential for harm-doing) modelled on 
Exline et al. (2008, Study 4, p. 504): “Recall a time when your country unjustly 
harmed another nation. Please briefly describe the impact of this event on the harmed 
nation below.”, and 
● control, identical to Saleem et al. (2015, Study 3, Online Appendix, p. 26): “Recall an 
uneventful, normal day in your week. Please briefly describe what your routine 
activities are during such a day”.  
Measures 
 All measures were answered on a Likert scale anchored by 0 (not at all) and 100 (very 
much). Full measures are available in the SOM. 
Pre-experimental measures. As recommended in the attachment literature (e.g., 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001), trait anxiety and avoidance were measured prior to the 
manipulation and controlled for when analyzing the effects of secure attachment primes. 
Additionally, gender, age, ingroup identification, and political orientation were measured 
prior to the experimental materials and were controlled in the analyses similar to practices 
reported by past research (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011; Saleem et al., 2015).  
Post-experimental measure.  
Mood. To isolate the potential effects of mood from the experimental manipulations, 
we included a mood measure (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001). 
Intergroup attitudes. Ten measures, borrowed from past literature, tapped different 
dimensions of intergroup attitudes: 1a) negative emotions towards terrorists, 1b) towards non-
ISIS Muslims, and 1c) towards the ingroup government; 2) dehumanization of terrorists; 3) 
competitive victimhood orientation towards Muslim victims; 4a) assigning responsibility for 
the attacks to one’s government, and 4b) to non-ISIS Muslims, 5) reconciliation towards non-
ISIS Muslims, 6) future forgiveness of ISIS, and 7) punitiveness towards ISIS (degrees of 
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torture). We assessed this wide range of intergroup attitudes for a number of reasons. First, we 
wanted to ensure that our study included the key outcome measures used in the disparate 
literatures that have emerged from the different interventions (see self-affirmation research for 
using acceptance of ingroup responsibility, Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011; see secure attachment 
research for using intergroup negative emotions, Saleem et al., 2015; see dissonance research 
for using a forgiveness measure, Exline et al., 2008). Second, we also wanted to include 
measures aimed to capture the latest state of the art in intergroup literature (e.g., blatant 
dehumanization; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015; competitive victimhood; 
Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013). Finally, this wide range of dependent variables also ensured 
a broad scope for the interventions to exert their effects. 
Results 
Frequentist Analyses 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted and revealed no experimental effect on 
participants’ mood (F = 1.83, p = .139; η2 = .003). Therefore, we can rule out any 
interferences of mood with our key outcomes (Carnelley & Rowe, 2010). Next, we examined 
the effect of the experimental manipulation on the main dependent variables. Given the large 
number of tests, we applied the Bonferroni correction method when conducting multiple 
comparisons (i.e., p-values were multiplied by factor 6). After controlling for trait avoidance 
and anxiety, age, gender, ingroup identification, and political orientation (as recommended by 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001), results revealed that, compared to the control condition, the 
interventions failed to exert a significant effect on the dependent variables (all Fs < 1.90, all 
ps > .13; all η2s < .004). This pattern of findings also held up without the inclusion of the 
control variables (all Fs < 1.81, all ps > .14; all η2s < .003). Moreover, no significant 
interaction effects were observed between the intervention manipulations and country (all Fs 
< 1.07, all ps > .38; all η2s < .006), meaning none of the interventions was more effective than 
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the control condition, regardless of participants’ proximity to the attacks (i.e., country). Of 
less relevance to the current study, country as a factor yielded a significant main effect. 
Overall, participants further away from the attacks appeared to display more outgroup bias 
than those living in the affected countries. These effects, including those of the intervention 
factor, are reported in full detail in the supplemental materials.  
The observed results unexpectedly provided no evidence in support of our main 
hypothesis. Given the large sample, these results are not due to insufficient power. In fact, to 
our knowledge, the current sample is by far the largest recorded sample in the literature. Still, 
frequentist analysis cannot offer a formal approach to directly evaluate the null hypothesis 
model (Gallistel, 2009; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018, p. 496). In order to gain further confidence 
in the present results, Bayesian analyses were conducted to directly test whether the given 
data would support the null hypothesis.  
Bayesian Analyses 
Using the BayesFactor package in R (with default priors Cauchy = 1 by Morey & 
Rouder, 2015), we calculated Bayes factors for the main effect for our experimental 
manipulations, the main effect for country, and their interaction on all ten outcomes (see 
Table 1). Bayes factors quantify the support for a specified alternative model versus a 
null model (or vice versa). A Bayes factor of 5 suggests that the alternative model is about 5 
times more likely than the null model, whereas a Bayes Factor of 0.2 suggests the opposite. 
Crucially, in the present study, all indices of the manipulation effect yielded very strong (< 
0.033) to even extreme (< 0.01) support in favor of the null model. For example, the Bayes 
factors for the experimental manipulation having an impact on emotions towards terrorists, 
Muslims, and one’s own government suggest that, respectively, it is about 222, 661, and 78 
times more likely that the manipulation did not have an impact than that it did (Table 1).  
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Similar to the frequentist analyses, results from Bayesian analyses converge and show 
that there are neither manipulation nor manipulation X country effects. Finally, support for the 
country main effect was substantial, as evidenced by the large Bayes factors (see Table 1). 
Similar to the frequentist analyses, respondents in remote countries (i.e., U.S. and UK) tended 
to be more biased toward the various outgroups than those in affected countries (i.e., France 
and Belgium). This proximity effect echoes Prasad’s (1935) work showing that reports of 
calamitous events spread rapidly and, through feelings of uncertainty and fear, might yield an 
even bigger impact on the unaffected (see also Festinger et al., 1948; Pezzo & Beckstead, 
2006). Nevertheless, other differences between these countries (e.g., in terms of religious or 
political systems) might also account for this effect. 
Table 1.  
Bayes factors for the manipulation, country, and manipulation*country effect on each 
outcome in Study 1, comparing the probability of the Ha model (i.e., “there is an effect”) 
being true as opposed to the H0 model (i.e., “there is no effect”) being true. Smaller Bayes 
factors indicate that the data is in support of the Ho model. 
Dependent Variable Manipulation Country Manipulation*Country 
Negative emotions towards terrorists 0.005 49.280 0.000 
Negative emotions towards Muslims 0.002 193.401 0.001 
Negative emotions towards own government 0.013 9411.171 0.000 
Dehumanization of terrorists 0.008 1003.462 0.001 
Competitive victimhood 0.020 0.375 0.001 
Ingroup government responsibility 0.008 3.954 0.001 
Outgroup (non-ISIS Muslim) responsibility 0.004 92.029 0.000 
Reconciliation towards non-ISIS Muslims 0.007 522.381 0.001 
Future forgiveness of ISIS 0.012 1.208 0.000 
Punitiveness (torture justification) 0.002 436.005 0.009 
 
Study 2 
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The results of Study 1 indicated that the interventions did not improve intergroup 
attitudes following the terror attacks. Past research has shown that following traumatic events, 
humans are likely to generate “freeze” responses (Schauer & Elbert, 2010; Schmidt, Richey, 
Zvolensky, & Maner, 2008). It is possible that the interventions were ineffective due to 
freezing immediately after the attacks. To examine this possibility, Study 2 tested the same 
interventions 2.5 years after the original attacks. Moreover, although research has 
demonstrated that the quality of data obtained from online platforms are no different from the 
quality of data obtained offline (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Goslin, 2011; Goodman, Cryder, & 
Cheema, 2013), to rule out that the results of Study 1 were not due to the online mode of data 
collection, data in Study 2 were collected from university students in a laboratory setting. 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and ninety-six Belgian students were invited to the lab in small groups, 
and they participated in the online study in return for partial course credit. All measures were 
administered in Flemish, after careful back-translation by two bilingual coauthors (cf., Study 
1). All participants provided meaningful responses (i.e., in relation to the intended 
manipulation prompts) and correctly responded to the attention check question (see 
supplemental materials for more information). Eleven respondents were excluded because 
they had an Arab (or mixed Arab) background. As in Study 1, these participants were 
excluded because it was unclear whether their responses represented intergroup or intragroup 
attitudes. Politically, the sample leaned toward a centrist and leftist orientation (40% centrist, 
45% leftist, and 15% rightist; generally reflecting the trends in the latest national elections, 
see Van Assche, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Roets, 2019). The final sample comprised of 285 White 
Caucasian students (20% male; M age = 19 years; SD = 5.09), with at least 70 participants per 
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condition. A power analysis revealed that our statistical power in this sample was .81 to detect 
a small effect, and .95 to detect a medium effect. 
Procedure and Measures 
Study 2 included a between-participants design with participants randomly assigned to 
one of the four conditions (self-affirmation, secure attachment, dissonance, vs. control). The 
materials were identical to those used in Study 1. All measures were answered on a Likert 
scale anchored by 0 (not at all) and 7 (very much). For full instructions, see supplemental 
materials.  
Results 
Frequentist Analyses 
Similar to Study 1, a one-way ANOVA revealed no experimental effect on 
participants’ mood (F = 0.13, p > .250; η2 = .001). Therefore, we can rule out any 
interferences of mood with our key outcomes. Next, we examined the effect of the 
experimental manipulation on the main dependent variables, applying the Bonferroni method 
to correct for multiple comparisons. As in Study 1, we report the main results with (as 
recommended by Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001) and without controlling for trait avoidance and 
anxiety, age, gender, ingroup identification, and political orientation. After including the 
control variables, results revealed that, compared to the control condition, the interventions 
failed to exert a significant effect on negative emotions towards terrorists, towards Muslims, 
and towards one’s own government, dehumanization of terrorists, competitive victimhood, 
ingroup government responsibility, outgroup (non-ISIS Muslim) responsibility, and future 
forgiveness of ISIS (all Fs < 1.65, all ps > .18; all η2s < .018). The same pattern of findings 
also held up when no control variables were included (all Fs < 1.34, all ps > .26; all η2s 
< .014). 
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As a minor variation from the results of Study 1, a significant effect of the intervention 
factor was found for punitiveness (F = 3.46, p = .017; η2 = .037), and a borderline significant 
intervention effect was found for reconciliation towards non-ISIS Muslims (F = 2.58, p 
= .054; η2 = .028). Pairwise comparisons indicated that punitiveness towards ISIS was lower 
in the secure attachment (vs. control) condition (Δsecure attachment-control = -0.45; p = .030) 
and dissonance (vs. control) condition (Δdissonance-control = -0.44; p = .040). Similarly, 
reconciliation towards Muslims was higher in the secure attachment (vs. control) condition 
(Δsecure attachment-control = 0.43; p = .041). Crucially, however, analyses without control 
variables rendered this significant intervention effect on punitiveness to barely reach 
significance levels (F = 2.27, p = .081; η2 = .024). Furthermore, pairwise comparisons without 
control variables on punitiveness produced a borderline significant difference between the 
secure attachment and control condition (Δsecure attachment-control = -0.42; p = .082), and a 
non-significant difference between the dissonance and control condition (Δdissonance-control 
= -0.33; p > .250).  
Bayesian Analyses 
To directly test the null hypothesis model (Gallistel, 2009), we calculated Bayes 
factors for the main effect of our experimental manipulation on all ten outcomes (see Table 
2). For negative emotions towards terrorists, negative emotions towards one’s own 
government, and ingroup government responsibility, and future forgiveness, these indices 
yielded very strong (< 0.033) support in favor of the null model. For negative emotions 
towards Muslims, competitive victimhood, and outgroup responsibility, there was strong 
(< .10) evidence for the null model. For dehumanization, reconciliation, and punitiveness, we 
found moderate (< 0.333) support for the null model. For instance, the Bayes factors for 
the experimental manipulation having an impact on emotions towards terrorists, on emotions 
towards Muslims, and on punitiveness suggest that, respectively, it is about 45, 18, and 3.4 
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times more likely that the manipulation did not have an impact than that it did (Table 2). 
Although somewhat smaller in size than in Study 1, these Bayesian analyses again 
corroborate the frequentist analyses, indicating that the intervention effects are either 
negligible or very small.  
Table 2.  
Bayes factors for the manipulation effect on each outcome in Study 2, comparing the 
probability of the Ha model (i.e., “there is an effect”) being true as opposed to the H0 model 
(i.e., “there is no effect”) being true. Smaller Bayes factors indicate that the data is in support 
of the Ho model. 
Dependent Variable Manipulation 
Negative emotions towards terrorists 0.022 
Negative emotions towards Muslims 0.057 
Negative emotions towards own government 0.024 
Dehumanization of terrorists 0.314 
Competitive victimhood 0.072 
Ingroup government responsibility 0.026 
Outgroup (non-ISIS Muslim) responsibility 0.091 
Reconciliation towards non-ISIS Muslims 0.302 
Future forgiveness of ISIS 0.019 
Punitiveness (torture justification) 0.297 
  
General Discussion 
Two studies aimed to compare the relative effectiveness of three established 
intergroup bias-reduction interventions among groups with varying degrees of proximity to 
actual real-life terror attacks. These interventions are the products of theories that have co-
evolved independently. Therefore, their relative effectiveness has not been tested, leading to 
disparate strands of literature. The current research investigated the comparative effectiveness 
of these interventions concurrently. It also aimed to move these interventions to real-life 
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settings from laboratory contexts that often employ minimal group paradigm with little 
history of intergroup tension, hostility, and terror (Hebl & Dovidio, 2005).  
Unlike past research, which tended to employ small to modest sample sizes (Ns 
ranging from 21 to 251; with the exception of Saleem et al.’s 2015 samples, which comprised 
between 278 to 307 participants), the present work used a high powered, heterogeneous adult 
sample in Study 1 (N = 1676) and a moderately powered, homogenous student sample in 
Study 2 (N = 285). Our data were collected from participants on online platforms (Study 1) 
and students in the lab (Study 2). If heterogeneity suppressed the effects in Study 1 due to the 
regional and political diversity of the sample, such diversity was absent in the sample of 
Study 2. Furthermore, to rule out the possibility that the immediacy and magnitude of the 
terror attacks may have suppressed the effects of the three interventions in Study 1 due to 
“freezing”, Study 2 was conducted two and half years after Study 1. Unexpectedly, the results 
from frequentist analyses show that these interventions (vs. control) were ineffective. 
Bayesian analyses further corroborated these findings by revealing that the data showed very 
strong to extreme (Study 1) and moderate to very strong (Study 2) support for the null 
hypothesis model.  
The current research reveals the cold facts that none of the established interventions 
was sufficiently potent to ameliorate intergroup negativity post terror attacks. These results 
were replicated across countries with varying proximity to the attacks, and among both online 
and laboratory contexts. Setting the studies against the backdrop of two major terror attacks 
may have provided a challenging test for these interventions because the effects found in 
previous studies were small (e.g., η2s < .119; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001). Such effects might 
be too small to be observed in the face of terror threat even though the current studies are 
sufficiently powered with close to 2,000 online and offline participants across four countries 
and two continents.  
20 
 
An important limitation of the current work is that the interventions were used one 
time only, and the order in which the outcomes were presented was not counterbalanced. 
Although these methods are consistent with the paradigm used in the literature (e.g., Čehajić-
Clancy et al., 2011; Exline et al., 2008; Saleem, et al., 2015), it is possible that, for example, a 
one-time intervention is not sufficient given the devastating magnitude and nature of terror 
attacks. Future research should explore the effectiveness of more prolonged and repeated 
exposures to these interventions. Such “wise” interventions (Walton, 2014) should target 
recursive processes to cause lasting changes. They should also be context-dependent, so we 
can clearly delineate what type of intervention works in which situation. Thirdly, a wise 
intervention needs to be psychologically precise. To illustrate, a lesson from the present 
research might be that the interventions tested here might not have sufficiently and 
specifically addressed the specific nature of threats, such as threats to safety and security, 
emanating from terrorist acts (Neuberg & Schaller, 2016). While past research has shown that 
our selected interventions may be quite versatile by exerting effects on a range of outcome 
variables across lab-based or post-conflict settings (e.g., Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011; Exline et 
al., 2008; Saleem et al., 2015), such versatility may have dampened their effectiveness in 
contexts of terror attacks, because the interventions were not sufficiently specific to address 
our participants’ threatened needs for safety and security. 
Another important lesson of the present research is for social psychologists to re-
consider the balance between internal and ecological validity in theory and empirical 
development. The historic trend in setting “neat” stories and “conclusive” findings as the 
implicit minimum criteria for publication seems to have pushed the balance more towards 
prioritizing internal validity over ecological validity (Hebl & Dovidio, 2005). This trend can 
be detrimental in many respects. It can strip research from its societal relevance leading to a 
disconnect between research and practice (Giner-Sorolla, 2019; Paluck & Green, 2009). As 
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such, the present work highlights the indispensability of testing the ecological validity of 
social psychological theories. In particular, as intergroup conflicts are intensifying across the 
world, within and between national boundaries, a better understanding the depths of their 
impacts - and how to ameliorate them - are ever-more important.  
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